Welcome back. "...back after {an} exclusive three year tour of Europe, Scandinavia and the sub continent" (Cab Calloway in the Blues Brothers). Ok, not really, I never left the city for more that a week at a time and that was for training. However, you may be asking yourself, where has Skeeter been? Well, it is a long story. But the cliff note version is a new job, completing my Masters degree, and earning several certifications. Now I am back to pondering Information Security thoughts in my blog. Hopefully on a more regular basis.
Today's topic is local admin on workstations or maybe just the process of change. An organizaiton has allowed users to have local admin on their respective workstation forever. But the world has changed and security controls need to be implemented. So, why is it so hard to take local admin away? It shouldn't take months and months of planning and then talking, and going back an forth. Why doesn't management get it? Is it just that people don't like change?
It should be as easy as send out the change message to the stakeholders, let them know how it affects them, why it needs to change (and how it protects them by changing), what the exception process is, test what needs to be an exception, and then GO.
I figure that 80% won't know that they lost local admin privilges -- 20% to deal with. Of that 20%, half will want it back, but don't have a business justificaiton for having it and therefore won't have the balls to submit the exception request. That leave just 10%, they probably need it at some point and time, but maybe not all the time. For those that do need it all the time, I am ok with them keeping it (for now and until we address that in another project). For those that only need it occasionally, we have a technical solution developed for them to contact their desktop support person and get it for a limited time.
Thanks for listening to the rant and until next time...
~Skeeter
Welcome
Skeeter Spray is a blog for the common Information Security Professional. Why Skeeter Spray? See Post #1
Thursday, May 12, 2016
Tuesday, August 6, 2013
Threat Modeling and Security Assessments
Over the last several months, in creating a threat
evaluation model / process and performing a security evaluation, I have come to
several conclusions.
In creating a threat model, you must create a process
that is repeatable, yet has some flexibility in it to meet different
situations. For example, evaluating
threats and vulnerabilities against an operating system, such as what patches
are missing, and what risk they bring to the current environment is different
than evaluating a process for password management. The threat model has to have some flexibility
to ensure both cases are able to utilize the process.
The security evaluation of another company’s enterprise
is more difficult that evaluating your own.
In my enterprise I know how management see risks in certain areas and I
can gauge what the remediation effort will be based on the experience of
working in my enterprise. However, when
evaluating another enterprise, is more difficult to know everything that may affect
the risk score and remediation efforts.
Overall, the exercise was very good and a good bit of
knowledge was gained.
Until next time…
~Skeeter
Sunday, July 28, 2013
Creating an Action Plan from a Security Review
After
all the work of performing a security review of an organization, it is time to
create an action plan. This plan must
be something the client can use, so it must be.…..actionable.
How
do you classify the threats and vulnerabilities that need to be addressed? Do you do it by functional area, location,
responsible area, severity, or by amount of effort to implement the
recommendation?
I
believe using a table format is the easiest to ready for the client. Additionally, I believe breaking the table up
by function area is also beneficial for the client. I choose to list the deficiencies by risk
level. This allows the client to quickly
identify the highest risk items for each section.
The typical action plan table will have the following headings
Vulnerable Area/System - The area (Active Directory) or System (Checkpoint Firewall)
Threat Description - A short description of the threat / vulnerability. The full description and/or risks will either be listed elsewhere in this report or in separate threat analysis report
Severity - The risk level of the threat...High, Medium, Low
Remediation Effort - This is based on the amount of work that will be required to implement the specific control. I prefer to use Costly, Moderate, Low.
Recommendation - This is the recommendation to correct the deficiency. I choose to keep this at a high level, as details can be provided to each responsible area.
Finally, an appendix of definitions. At a minimum it includes the definitions of the Risk ratings and Remediation Effort ratings.
Until next time....
~Skeeter
Monday, July 15, 2013
Threat & Vulnerability Mitigation – Asset Identification
No
matter what you all your program (I call mine Vulnerability Management) to
manage threats and vulnerabilities as they apply to your network and processing
environment you must know what you have for assets.
Assets
---equipment, operating systems, virtual environments, applications,
infrastructure parts and pieces --- need to be identified by manufacture, make,
model, version, etc... While it will be
a chore to initially identified and gather all the information of these assets;
the hard part may be keeping the data current without proper processes in
place.
When
setting up the process to gather and keep the information current, keep in mind
that it should be part of other processes.
For example, during the project phase for new systems, include a step to
update the asset database. Including a
step in the change management process that requires an update of the asset
database with the new information will ensure existing assets are kept current.
One
of the items that is frequently forgot in the asset identification is the
network infrastructure. Don’t forget to
identify the firewalls, proxy servers, VPN concentrators, switches, wireless
equipment (switches and access points), and network management devices. As a security professional, make sure you
include your own systems, such as a SIEM, DLP, A/V and malware servers, and
vulnerability scanners.
A
key part of the tracking of threats against assets is knowing how the devices
are configured and used in your environment.
An example would be Active Directory…what changes are made from the
default configurations? How does your
password policy compare? Is it weaker
or stronger? This could have an effect
on the risk rating applied to a vulnerability identified for your operating
system.
Once
you have the assets of your IT environment identified, it is time to start down
the identification of SCADA and other control systems…..good luck.
Until
next time….
~Skeeter
Tuesday, July 9, 2013
How, What, and When to Patch
How an
enterprise decides to manage patch administration probably varies based on who
is doing it, the maturity of the Vulnerability Management program, and the
business’ tolerance of maintenance windows.
In my opinion patching should be broken into four categories:
(1)
Infrastructure. This would be servers, devices, applications
that are used by IT and can be patched with no impact to business users or
business processes. This patching can
be accomplished as often as necessary, but monthly will probably work out the
best.
(2) Servers / Operating Systems.
This category includes the Windows and / or Linux servers in the
environment. This is where IT management
needs to get a recurring maintenance window from the business that is always
available for IT to use whether it is needed or not. In my humble opinion this window should be
available weekly. While we are probably
not going to patch weekly, this windows can be used to fix application
problems, apply emergency / critical patches, etc… Server patching probably can’t be performed
more that quarterly because you will need time to test patches in the non-prod
environment.
(3)
Applications. This category includes business applications
such as ERP systems, HR systems, etc…
These systems should be patched during the maintenance window arranged
by IT management above. How often this
patching occurs will depend on the business’ desire because it will take good
amount of resources to test the patches and identify any impacts on systems
that may feed or receive data from the patched system. Twice a year maybe the best case scenario; once
a year maybe the answer the schedule that works best for the business.
(4)
Workstations. This is where the biggest risk may be located
for the enterprise. While the endpoint
security (anti-virus, anti-malware, etc…) should be updating daily, OS patching
should be applied monthly. If a standard
desktop image is used, testing should be pretty straightforward and a reboot by
users once a month isn’t to much to ask.
No matter
what schedule an enterprise decides on, the key is management buy-in and
communications to the user community.
Once the schedule is set, stick to it and only deviate in rare and
unique situations.
Until next
time…
~Skeeter
Saturday, July 6, 2013
Vulnerability Sites ---- revisited
Several weeks ago I posted a list of sites and links
where threat and vulnerability information can be gathered from. Since then I have again had the privilege of
running a number of scenarios through my threat process model and want to up
you on the applicability of the links I provided.
My recent research confirmed the format of http://www.securityfocus.com where you
can search via drop downs. For example
you select Cisco, then all Cisco products are presented and you can select the
product in question. If the product has
versions, you may also select that. I
also visited the Cisco website to search for vulnerabilities on their Nexus
7000, although several showed up, the site doesn’t tell you directly that a fix
has been released.
http://web.nvd.nist.gov
also served me well, but you must know
exactly what you want to search for vs. the menu options of the securityfocus
site.
For operating systems, such as Windows 2008, the NVD site
works very well for searching. It will
list all the vulnerabilities and provide a link to the vendors site, in this
case to Microsoft Technet and the 2008 security bulletin.
For other situations such as VMware ESXi or a Belkin
router, I would continue to use the NVD site to search for vulnerabilities and
visit the vendor site if more information was needed regarding patch status.
Until next time…
~SkeeterSaturday, June 29, 2013
Controlling Privileged Access
First, I define privileged access as anything above what
the standard user would get? How do you
control privileged access? Do you allow
your Linux system administrators to have the root password? Do you Windows administrators have the
password for a system account with admin privileges? Or maybe they have domain admin rights
assigned to their personal account.
A while back I attended a presentation about for a
product that stores the passwords for accounts…the assumption is that all
privileged accounts would be stored in this solution along with the
passwords. This system is also capable
of being integrated with AD and your ticketing system so when a user needed the
password, the system would check to make sure there is a valid ticket (incident
or change request) and that the requestor is also in the right AD group. This security solution will also change the
password after a set amount of time from when the password was retrieved. This would seemingly prevent the user from
reusing the password for an unlimited about of time.
While I can see why management and Internal Audit would
love this solution….on the surface it meets the compliance requirements for
controlling access and assists with the change management process. This system is also very useful in storing
passwords that don’t get used very often, thus making sure they are available
in a business continuity situation. However,
does it help a company be secure or does it give a false sense of security?
What are the actual actions performed when the password
is retrieved? The IT guy could retrieve
the password and make any change under the guise of whatever the Incident or
Change ticket talked about. Every
environment has those system accounts where the password is never changed. These accounts tend to have a high level of
privileges and everyone on the team knows the password….so no trouble ticket is
required to use these accounts. I could
go on and on, but you get the point.
What is the solution?
So will argue that the administrators need admin privileges all the time….it
is their job. I don’t necessarily
disagree with that. I believe the
solution lies in monitoring what the privileged accounts are doing. Implementing one of the solutions that
monitors key folders, directories, and files for access and modification is
also needed.
Until next time…
~Skeeter
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